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ABSTRACT 
The Navy's Intrusion Detection process is currently reactive in nature.   It is 
designed and programmed to detect and provide alerts to the Fleet Information Warfare 
Center (FIWC) of suspicious network activity while it is in progress, as well as to 
record/store data for future reference.   However, the majority of activity taking place 
within and across Naval networks is legitimate and not an unauthorized activity.   To 
allow for efficient access and utilization of the information systems sharing the network 
Intrusion Detection Systems must be set at a level that filters out activity deemed as 
normal or non-hostile, while still providing an appropriate level of security.   With this 
filtering in place an IDS system will not register all suspicious activity, and may not 
detect mild and seemingly harmless activity.   When increasing security, limits must be 
imposed upon access.   This thesis examines FIWC network incident data from 1999 to 
see if a correlation can be drawn between United States visibility in the foreign media 
during 1999 and the occurrence of suspicious network incidents. A positive correlation 
may provide advance-warning indicators that could lead to the development of a 
procedure for increasing security posture based on the current environment.    These 
indicators would provide a more proactive method of'defense, significantly reduce 
potential damage caused by hostile network incidents and provide for more efficient 
network activity. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
Information, information processing, and communications networks are at the 
core of every military activity. The military forces of the United States rely upon real- 
time information to acquire and maintain an information dominance and superiority. It is 
information superiority that allows the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do 
the same (JV 2020). However, having information superiority does not equate to having 
perfect or accurate information. Collected data will only be as good as the systems and 
processes that are in place to ensure its reliability and accuracy. Only then can coherent 
information be gathered to provide a competitive advantage by translation into superior 
knowledge and decisions. 
Information Operations (10) are actions taken to affect an adversary's information 
and information systems while defending one's own information and information 
systems. It is segmented into Offensive and Defensive arenas, with Defensive 10 
focused on integrating and coordinating policies and procedures, operations, personnel, 
and technology to protect and defend information and information systems (Joint Pub 3- 
13). Defensive 10 is conducted to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information 
access while denying exploitation of friendly information and information systems. 
Information Assurance (IA) is the function of Defensive 10 that seeks to protect and 
defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
identification and authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.    IA employs 
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technologies and processes such as multilevel security, access controls, secure network 
servers, and intrusion detection software. 
One of the ways the Navy conducts Information Assurance is through the Fleet 
Information Warfare Center (FIWC), which provides network Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) coverage for the Navy. Utilizing the Cisco Secure IDS (formerly Net Ranger), as 
well as email and live phone reports from network administrators at Naval Network 
Operation Centers (NOCs) and Naval installations, Navy network incident data is 
transmitted  to   and  collected  by the  Naval  Computer  Incident  Response  Team 
(NAVCIRT) operations center located at Norfolk, Virginia.   There it is analyzed and 
verified by network technicians, then compiled to formulate a current situation picture 
and develop a historical database.   All verified incidents are recorded, processed and 
passed on to the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND).   This 
manual analysis is utilized to determine significant events and to help reduce false alerts 
caused by legitimate network activity and random noise. 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, an activity of the U.S. Department of 
Energy, has developed automated tools for data-mining vast amounts of textual 
information. These software tools are capable of searching for key words and phrases 
within data sources, and then presenting the results in a graphic theme schematic. This 
format always for the viewing of seemingly unrelated textual data, which is clustered and 
grouped together based on common themes, key words or phrases found within the data 
and presented in a three dimensional display. Currently, the Land Information Warfare 
Activity (LIWA) for the U.S. Army and the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) 
utilize these tools. 
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Reports produced by the 
Central Intelligence Agency provide for an extensive amount of data concerning the 
foreign media. FBIS offers an extensive, in-depth collection of translations and 
transcriptions of open source information monitored worldwide on such diverse topics as 
military affairs, politics, the environment, societal issues, economics, and science and 
technology. The information is obtained monitoring radio, television, press, periodicals, 
books and other sources of unrestricted information such as databases and gray literature. 
B.       STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Intrusion detection is a process that is reactive in nature. It is designed and to 
detect and provide alerts to automated monitoring systems and network administrators of 
suspicious network activity while it is in progress, or after it has occurred. Being able to 
determine why something happened would make it possible to determine when it might 
happen again. The hypothesis is that the visibility of the United States within the foreign 
media is directly correlated to the frequency of network incidents seen on Navy networks. 
The null hypothesis is that the two are not related. 
Time series analysis is based on the premise that successive observations are 
usually not independent of one another.   When successive observations are dependent, 
future values may be predicted from past observations.   It is important to note that in 
most cases the future is only partially determined by previous events. Exact predictions 
are impossible, however, future values will have probability distributions based on past 
occurrences.   This thesis examines FIWC network incident data from 1999 to see if a 
correlation can be drawn between United States visibility in the foreign media during 
1999 and the occurrence of detected network incidents.   A positive correlation may 
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provide advance-warning indicators that could lead to the development of a procedure for 
increasing security posture based on the current environment. These indicators would 
provide a more proactive method of defense, significantly reduce potential damage 
caused by hostile network incidents and provide for more efficient network activity. 
1. Research Questions 
a. Can a methodology be developed to provide for a more proactive process of 
network defense? 
b. Is there a correlation between network incidents on Navy networks and 
visibility of the United States in the foreign media? 
c. Is United States visibility within the foreign media an event determinant? 
2. Scope and Assumptions 
This thesis will focus on FIWC data from recorded network incidents and foreign 
media events during 1999. The year 1999 will provide a complete history of recorded 
Naval network incident data from all fleet and shore installations; and the foreign media 
data from every country processed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. This 
will not be a technically focused discussion of what type of security measures to 
implement or how a network should be managed, but an analysis of incidents and foreign 
media events that transpired at approximately the same time to determine possible 
correlation. It'is impossible to determine the speed of information flow. The Internet has 
provided near real-time access to news and events with transmission and response time 
being a fast as the click of a button. A logical assumption is that the majority of incidents 
are by trained adversaries with a formulated plan.   With this in mind the correlation 
planning figure used for lead-time between incident and media visibility is approximately 
48 hours. 
The advent and growing expansion of the World Wide Web and the Internet has 
made geographical boundaries a thing of the past. For example, a terrorist organization 
with religious or political ties to a country in the Middle East could actually be located 
within the continental United States or anywhere in the world and still conduct cyber 
attacks. During the investigation and verification of network incidents NAVCIRT does 
determine the actual originating source location of the incident. However, this specific 
location information makes the incident itself classified, so for this thesis actual physical 
location of attack is immaterial. 
United States visibility in the foreign media will be used to correlate incidents or 
attacks. As stated, it is possible to determine the actual physical location of origin, but 
that alone is not enough to prove association to a foreign country. The assumption here is 
that foreign media is similar to domestic media, and that visibility in the press is a valid 
indicator regardless of media source. The same analysis could be done using domestic 
media events. 
C.        RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Analyze network incidents and "visible" media events to establish whether a 
correlation exists between the two. If a correlation can be determined between United 
States visibility and network incidents, then a procedure for increasing security posture 
based on the current environment may be developed. This would help to significantly 
reduce potential damage caused by hostile network incidents.   Specifically, the Fleet 
Information Warfare Center is looking into the area of proactive network defense to 
better protect the Navy's information assets. A proactive approach to network defense 
could be utilized service wide to potentially provide regional warnings for increased 
security posture. 
II.  FLEET INFORMATION WARFARE CENTER 
A.        OVERVIEW 
1. History 
FIWC assumed the role of Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT) 
from SPA WAR on 1 October 1995. FIWC Headquarters and its subordinate detachments 
provide Information Warfare operational support to naval forces worldwide. In-service 
engineering Information Security (INFOSEC) support to include: hardware/software 
installations, firewall design and installations, product reviews, technical assistance, and 
acquisition of INFOSEC-related products is still conducted by SPA WAR Systems Center 
Charleston. In its brief history, the FrWC team has developed Information Warfare (IW) 
doctrine and tactics, provided highly skilled IW operational teams to deploying naval 
units, and pioneered defensive computer network support throughout the Navy and 
Marine Corps. 
2. Mission and Structure 
The Fleet Information Warfare Center's Naval Computer Incident Response 
Team (NAVCIRT), focuses on ensuring Navy and Marine Corps computer systems are 
capable of providing complete and unaltered information while withstanding malicious 
(internal and external) disruptions and attacks. It's mission is to provide continuously 
improving Information Warfare (IW) support, which encompasses and integrates all IW 
disciplines, to deploying and operating Naval forces worldwide as tasked by 
CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, and COMUSNAVCENT. FIWC 




Figure 2.1 U.S. Navy Organizational Structure (From: Reference 10) 
The NAVCIRT office was chartered under CNO ALCOM 45/95 to be the Navy and 
Marine Corps' single point of contact for reporting and handling computer security 
incidents and vulnerabilities. As the Naval Center of Excellence of Information Warfare 
(IW), FIWC is the preeminent command engaged in expanding the tactical commanders 
advantage in information exploitation, protection, and attack. 
B.        NETWORK SECURITY 
1.        Naval Computer Incident Response Team 
The Naval Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT), operated by the Fleet 
Information Warfare Center, provides computer security incident support to Department 
of Navy (DON) activities. As designated by OPNAVFNST 2201.2, Navy and Marine 
Corps Computer Network Incident Response, NAVCIRT serves as the department of the 
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Navy (DON) focal point for the Department of Defense (DOD) exchange on computer 
technical vulnerabilities, viruses, and "hacker" incidents. NAVCIRT is also a member of 
the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), which is comprised of 
international government agencies and commercial firms.    NAVCFRT also provides 
computer security advisories which contain current vulnerability announcements on 
various systems, antiviral software information, and information on hacker incidents. 
There are four NOCs that are in direct support to the Navy fleets, broken down into four 
theater regions: Atlantic, Pacific, European, and Indian. The resource sponsor for FIWC 
is the Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (CNO N6). FIWC is authorized direct 
liaison   with   fleet   commanders   in   chief,   numbered   fleets,   type   commanders, 
COMNAVSECGRUCOM,   carrier  and  cruiser/destroyer  group   commanders,  navy 
laboratories, Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force, and other agencies. 
The Operations (N3) department (see Figure 2.2) is organized under the Directorate of 
NAVCIRT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 
CIRT Projects 
0-3/1 


















Figure 2.2 NAVCIRT Organization Structure 
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Operations, Plans, and Requirements. The department is divided into two divisions: 
NAVCIRT (N31) and Information Warfare-Defensive (IW-D) Operations (N32). 
NAVCIRT personnel coordinate actions involving security incidents and vulnerabilities, 
maintain the incident database, track all open incidents, provide technical support to 
customers, provide advisories on vulnerabilities to the fleet, and provide other technical 
support as required. 
2.       Intrusion Detection 
Computer systems bring together a multitude of vulnerabilities.    Hardware 
vulnerabilities are shared among the computer, the communication facilities, and the 
remote units and consoles, while software vulnerabilities are at all levels of the machine 
operating system and supporting software. There are three major categories of 
vulnerabilities: accidental disclosures, deliberate penetrations, and physical attack. And 
although an organization must be concerned with all three, it is deliberate penetration that 
provides the need for intrusion detection. 
FIWC's Computer Network Defense Division uses various Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) and processes to monitor Navy networks worldwide. Although FIWC is 
the center for network defense for the Navy, they are supported by four Naval Network 
Operation Centers (NOCs) that provide direct support to the Fleet. These NOCs provide 
regional network support based on a unit's location. Support to units will change as the 
unit transitions between regions. This transition between NOCs is transparent to the user. 
An IDS will provide real-time intrusion alerts, designed to detect and report 
unauthorized activity throughout a network from a centralized environment. The Cisco 
Secure Intrusion Detection System (CSIDS), formerly known as NetRanger, works and 
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records network activity on a continuous basis and can operate in both Internet and 
intranet environments to protect an organizations' entire network. The EDS includes two 
components: Sensor and Director. The sensors, are high-speed network devices that 
analyze the content and context of individual packets to determine if traffic is authorized. 
While the Director terminals are located at the four Network Operating Centers, the Net 
Ranger sensors are distributed throughout the fleet and attached to all gateways between 
the Navy's Intranet and the Internet. If unauthorized activity is detected the sensor 
forwards alarms to the director management console. It can monitor almost any type of 
TCP/IP network, ranging from Internet connections, LAN segments, or dial-in modem 
pools. The Director is a high-performance software-based management system that 
centrally monitors the activity of multiple Sensors located on local or remote network 
segments. The ability to monitor many sensors and retain consistent quality of security 
allows network administrators to pinpoint the location and type of an attack and respond. 
11 
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III.    PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORIES 
A.        OVERVIEW 
1. History 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL) began in 1965, and was contracted 
to perform research and development for the Hanford Nuclear Site in southeastern 
Washington State. The Laboratory's first projects were based on the needs of the Hanford 
Site and included protecting the environment, fabricating reactor fuel, and designing 
reactors. These projects, staff expertise in diverse fields, and national needs led to 
outstanding research and development in several key areas: environment, health, energy, 
computer science, and security. In the early 1990s, Pacific Northwest Laboratory became 
one of the multiprogram laboratories in the U.S. Department of Energy's national 
laboratory system. These labs augment America's existing academic and industrial 
research infrastructure. Research at the laboratories addresses national needs in such 
areas as environment, national security, health, manufacturing, high-performance 
computing, advanced materials, and other areas. Today, Pacific Northwest combines 
capabilities from a multitude of scientific and engineering disciplines to aid in the 
development of software tools to speed the discovery process. Their goal is to develop 
and enhance information systems and technologies by providing; data and knowledge 
engineering, real-time data acquisition and analysis and synthesis analysis and 
visualization of information. 
2. Mission 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's core mission is to deliver environmental 
science and technology in the service of the nation and humanity. Through basic research 
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they create fundamental knowledge of natural, engineered, and social systems that is the 
basis for both effective environmental technology and sound public policy. They also 
apply their capabilities to meet selected national security, energy, and human health 
needs; strengthen the U.S. economy; and support the education of future scientists and 
engineers. This mission supports the U.S. Department of Energy's Strategic Laboratory 
Mission Plan, where Pacific Northwest is designated as a principal laboratory in the 
environmental quality mission, a major contributing laboratory in both science and 
technology and energy, and a participating laboratory in national security. 
B.       VISUAL INFORMATION ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
Visual Information Analysis (VIA) is the use of advanced computer graphics 
technologies to support the interactive visualization and exploration of large collections 
of complex information. More than just information visualization, Visual Information 
Analysis is the process of both examining and interacting with dynamic visual 
representations of information. The key components of any VIA system are 1) the 
information model the system uses to internally represent the contents of, and 
interrelationships among, the elements of an information collection, and 2) the 
visualization tools and user interface used to graphically represent (and support 
interaction with) the information model. An effective VIA system will incorporate both a 
rich, flexible data model, and a comprehensive set of powerful visual information 
analysis tools. 
2.        Spacial Paradigm for Information Retrieval and Exploration 
Spacial Paradigm for Information Retrieval and Exploration (SPIRE) is a Visual 
Information Analysis tool designed to help with the identification of trends, patterns or 
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unexpected occurrences of themes or topics. Specifically, SPIRE provides the user with 
a macro-level view of thematic changes in a collection of documents. Users are able to 
interact with the visualization to explore the information to investigate apparent or 
unusual patterns, and other features of interest. The VIA represents each document or 
group of documents with an icon for a particular time period. Using SPIRE's 
visualization feature, a user may view a grouping of documents that span a specific 
period of time, or common theme. This type of visualization is called document-centric. 
SPIRE is a new type of software that allows you to explore complex relationships 
among documents in a textual dataset. SPIRE is unique because it provides a visual 
interface to your data. Not only can you explore relationships by simply examining 
visualizations, but also you can interactively sift through documents to refine searches 
and explore temporal relationships in your data. SPIRE uses two technologies to perform 
this task: Galaxies and Theme View visualizations. 
The Galaxies Visualization (see Figure 3.1) is a scatter plot visualization in which 
documents are distributed across a two dimensional space. In the Galaxies visualization, 
documents are positioned so that they are located close to other highly related documents. 
By examining a Galaxies visualization, you can rapidly find clusters of related documents 
and explore inter-document relationships.   The ThemeView Visualization (see Figure 
3.2) is a content-based visualization derived from the Galaxies Visualization.   In a 
ThemeView visualization, the dataset is represented as a landscape in which peaks 
indicate areas of high thematic content.   The Galaxies visualization is a revolutionary 
approach to understanding relationships found in large textual datasets.   Instead of 
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Figure 3.2 ThemeView Visualization 
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visualization gives you the ability to visually explore the relationships between all of 
your documents in a single visual metaphor~a picture of the entire textual dataset. In this 
visualization, you can visually locate and evaluate relationships between documents 
based on their proximity to each other. This allows you to quickly identify important 
documents in the dataset and to understand how all of the information is structured. 
A ThemeView visualization is a 3-D feature map that shows where major 
concepts and themes are located in your dataset.  Through a simple image, ThemeView 
visualizations can summarize the contents of an entire dataset, identify where major 
concepts are located, and detail the interrelationships between them. Combined with the 
thematic query tool, a ThemeView display becomes both a visual and interactive 
approach to exploring dataset contents.  ThemeView visualizations are created from the 
Galaxies visualization by examining the contents of documents for words (called topics 
or themes) that best distinguish those documents from other regions of the dataset. When 
a localized region of documents containing similar themes occurs, a peak is assigned to 
that region.   The height of the peak is dependent on how intensely the information is 
concentrated at that location. The net result of this approach is a graphic terrain in which 
strong themes are represented by high peaks. These peaks are easily identifiable and can 
provide insight into the information content of a dataset. 
17 
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IV.    DATA 
A.       DESCRIPTION AND SELECTION 
1.        Naval Network Incidents 
The Armed Services Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) have 
established guidelines for categorizing network incidents by type. These categories vary 
in severity range from level one to seven (see Table 4.1). Level seven deals with virus 
activity and will not be addressed in this thesis. The indiscriminate nature of a computer 
Category Description 
I Unauthorized Root Access 
n Unauthorized User Access 
m Attempted Access 
rv Denial of Service 
V Poor Security Practice 
VI Probe or Scan 
vn Malicious Code 
Table 4.1 Incident Category Description 
virus, combined with the extreme difficulty in determining originating location and 
overall motivation for dispersal, would potentially allow for the introduction of outliers 
into the data set, which could skew the overall results. 
19 
NAVCIRT receives and collects Naval network incident data from IDS sensors 
and installation network administrators for all Navy networks. As stated, some of the 
data received is via IDS sensors, but the majority of incident data is gathered from emails 
and phone calls directly from installation network administrators to the NAVCIRT 
network analyst. Once received the incidents are investigated by the NAVCIRT analysts 
to determine the severity of the incident and its potential impact on the organization. If 
the incident is verified by the analyst it is categorized based on the JOINT CERT 
guidelines. Action will be taken by NAVCIRT personnel to correct or repair the affected 
system or area, and a notification report will be sent to JTFCND. 
2.        Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) offers an extensive, in-depth 
collection of translations and transcriptions of open source information monitored 
worldwide on such diverse topics as military affairs, politics, the environment, societal 
issues, economics, and science and technology. The information is obtained monitoring 
radio, television, press, periodicals, books and other sources of unrestricted information 
such as databases and gray literature. These translations and transcriptions are known 
collectively as "FBIS Reporting." Information is collected from foreign media from all 
over the world. All collected data is translated and converted into a basic text electronic 
format. The data collected is available daily through the FBIS website, or in a quarterly 
update on CD ROM.   The FBIS quarterly updates for the year 1999 will be used to 
provide the data source for the Visual Information Analysis tool SPIRE to analyze. The 
documents contained within the 1999-year data group will be from foreign media source 
across the globe. 
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B.        DATA AGGREGATION 
1.        Naval Network Incidents 
The Navy has been monitoring and recording network data since the mid-90's, 
however, prior to the year 1999 the data available was only from three Network 
Operating Centers. Data used in this thesis will be from validated incidents, categories I- 
VI, recorded during the year 1999 between January 1st and December 31st, because it is 
the first set of data to incorporate all four of the Navy's NOCs. During the entire year 
there were a total of 19,792 separate legitimate incidents. The data will be aggregated on 
a weekly basis throughout the year providing a total of 52 individual points of reference. 
Summary statistics (see Table 4.1) on the data indicate a maximum of 695 incidents and a 
minimum of 205 incidents per week throughout the year. There is a mean, or average 
value, of 380 with a standard deviation of 117. This would allow for the assumption that 
on the average there are approximately 380 incidents per week, give or take 117. But as 
you can see from Figure 4.1 this is slightly misleading as the number of incidents was 
lower in the first half of the year and higher in the second half. 
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Weekly Incidents for 1999 
<**     «V     #»     **     2»     ** 
Time {by week) 
Figure 4.1 Network Incidents 
Mean 380.6153846 
Standard Error 16.19792163 
Median 371.5 
Mode 320 
Standard Deviation 116.804874 








Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
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2.        Media Visibility 
The FBIS data is broken down into four quarters of approximately 3 months 
duration for the year 1999 (see Figure 4.2), beginning with December 30. 1998 and 
ending with December 31,1999. Each quarter will be processed separately into its own 
dataset using SPIRE to create a Galaxies visualization from the datasets of raw, 
unformatted, unstructured text documents within the FBIS. The documents in a dataset 
are first processed by a text engine, which analyzes relationships among the words used 
and encodes those relationships numerically. In the Galaxies visualization, each 
document is represented as a point, called a docustar. Documents are logically grouped 
into relationships called clusters; these are represented in the Galaxies visualization as 
cluster centroids. Based on the numerical encoding computed by the text engine, 
documents and clusters of documents in the resulting Galaxies Visualization are 
positioned based on their relationship to every other document and cluster in the dataset. 
Proximity indicates relatedness, so documents and clusters that are similar in topical 
content will be shown with their docustars and centroids located closely together, while 
documents and clusters that are radically different in subject matter will have their 
symbols spaced farther apart in the visualization. 
Each FBIS dataset is further delineated by separating the quarterly data into 
weekly increments using the Time Slicer feature (see Figure 4.2 FBIS Time Slices). The 
overall number of documents is indicated by the height of the bar representing each week 
within a particular quarter. The lower shaded portion of each bar is representative of the 
number of documents within the weekly totals that were indications of United States 
visibility. 
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Weekly Visibility for 1999 
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V.      METHODOLOGY 
A.        OVERVIEW 
The methodology for data collection in this study was a combination of literature 
review, personnel interviews and qualitative analysis of historical data. The data for the 
background chapter were collected through literature review of various reference 
materials. The data for the chapter on the Fleet Information Warfare Center and Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory were conducted through a literature review of internal documents 
and personnel interviews. The data for the analysis chapter was gathered based on a 
review of historical Navy network incident data and qualitative analysis of Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service reports based on documented foreign media from 1999 
using the SPIRE VIA tool. 
The theory of correlation was based on the time series concept that successive 
observations are usually not independent of one another. Examples occur in a variety of 
fields, ranging from stock prices or rainfall measured on successive days to population 
demographics measured annually. The purpose of analyzing a series of observations may 
be classified as description, explanation, and prediction. Description is the first step in 
any analysis, and will be the basis for this research. Plotting the data and obtaining basic 
statistics will make the identification of obvious features inconsistent with the data set as 
a whole, such as, trends, turning points and outliers, made visible (Chatfield, 1996). 
Explanation may generate a better understanding of the process that generated the series. 
Finally, prediction or forecasting (which are used interchangeably) is the process of 
27 
looking at past data and developing a systematic process for determining the most 
probable future outcome. 
The relationship between two variables can be represented by the use of a 
mathematical formula. The Simple Linear Regression Model is one of the simplest and 
most easily understood formats. 
Yj = b0 + bi • X| + 6i 
Where 
Yi = independent variable 
X; = dependent variable 
b0 = Y intercept for the population 
bi = slope for the population 
8j = random error in Y for observation i 
In this model, the slope (bi) represents the amount of change in Y for a particular unit 
change in X and the Y intercept (b0) represents the average value of Y when X equals 0. 
B.        HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Hypothesis testing is a phase of statistical analysis that utilizes a step-by-step 
process to obtain inferences concerning data, and determines the differences between 
observed results and the results that were expected based on some underlying theory. 
Testing begins with a theory or idea concerning a particular population of data. The 
initial hypothesis of this research is that there is a correlation between Naval Network 
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Incidents and US Visibility in the foreign media.   Stated another way, the independent 
variable (visibility) affects the dependent variable (incidents). 
The first step is the development of the null hypothesis (H0), which is always one 
of no difference. In this case, there is no effect by the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, or the slope coefficient (bj) is equal to zero. 
H0: bi = 0 
The slope represents the expected change in variable (y) per unit change in variable (x). 
The null hypothesis is always tested, always contains an equal sign and always refers to a 
specific value of the population parameter. If however the null hypothesis is proven false 
then something else must be true. This is planned for by the statement of the alternate 
hypothesis. The alternate hypothesis (Hi) is the opposite of the null hypothesis and 
represents the conclusion reached by rejecting the null hypothesis if there is sufficient 
evidence to determine it is untrue. 
Hi:bi*0 
The process is designed to so that the rejection of the null hypothesis is based on 
evidence that the alternate hypothesis is far more likely. Even if the null hypothesis is 
true, sampling error will likely cause the statistic to differ from the parameter value. 
Hypothesis testing accounts for this by establishing of a clearly defined quantifying 
process, which determines the distribution for the statistic of interest and then computes a 
particular test statistic. Since sample distributions usually follow a normal distribution 
they can be used to determine the likelihood of the null hypothesis being true. 
29 
Distribution of the test statistic is divided into two regions, a region of rejection 
and a region of nonrejection.   If the statistic falls within the region of nonrejection the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The region of rejection on the other hand consists of 
values of the test statistic that are unlikely to occur if the null hypothesis is true. The size 
of the rejection region is determined by the critical value (which divides the nonreject 
region from the reject region) and the level of risk accepted.  However, there is always 
the possibility when using a sample statistic that an incorrect conclusion will be reached. 
When conducting hypothesis testing there are two type of errors that can occur. A Type I 
error occurs if the null hypothesis is rejected when it is actually true. The probability of 
committing a Type I (a) error is referred to as the level of significance.   The level of 
significance is determined before testing is performed and is usually at a level of .05 or 
smaller. Determination of the level of significance will establish the size of the rejection 
region. A Type II (ß) error occurs if the null hypothesis is not rejected and it is actually 
false.    The risk of a Type II error is determined by the difference between the 
hypothesized and actual values of the parameter. 
C.       AUTOCORRELATION 
Statistical tests depend on the randomness of the data being analyzed.   This 
randomness constitutes one of the four assumptions that underlie all measurement 
processes.   If the data is not random then the validity of the statistical conclusions 
become suspect. When looking at time series, if successive error terms are independent 
of one another then so are successive observations.   However, if the error terms are 
statistically dependent then so are the successive observations.  The observations would 
be called autocorrelated.   The assumption of independency of errors is often violated 
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when data is collected over a period of time because a residual at one point in time may 
tend to be similar to residuals at adjacent points in time. Measuring autocorrelation is a 
technique that checks for randomness in a data set and can determine whether an 
observation is related to an adjacent observation.   The Durbin-Watson (D) statistic can 
detect and measure the correlation between each residual and the residual for the time 
period immediately preceding the one of interest. If the residuals are not correlated, the 
value of D will be close to 2.  A value of D close to 0 denotes positive autocorrelation, 
while a value of D close to 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. When attempting to use 
the Durbin-Watson technique the main issue is when does the level of autocorrelation fall 
sufficiently below 2 to cause concern about the validity of the data. This determination is 
dependent on the number of observations (n), the number of independent variables (p) in 
the model and the level of significance (a). Based on these three items a standard table 
for the Durbin-Watson Statistic will provide two critical values.    The value (di,) 
represents the lower critical value. If D is below dL then there is evidence of positive 
autocorrelation. The value (du) represents the upper critical value. If D is above du then 
there is no evidence of autocorrelation among the residuals. If the value of D is between 
dL and du then it is impossible to make a definite conclusion about the data. 
In the event that a data set is determined to be autocorrelated it is necessary to 
account for the correlation between residuals by transforming the data prior to conducting 
any regression analysis. This transformation is accomplished by using the previously 
determined Durbin-Watson statistic to find the estimate of the autocorrelation parameter 
(r) and transform both the independent (y) and dependent (x) variable. 
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Estimate of the autocorrelation parameter: 
r = l-(D/2) 
Transformation of independent variable (y to y*): 
yi* = (Vl-r2).yi 
y2* = y2-(r«yi) 
y3* = y3-(r»y2) 
I 
yn* = yn-(r»y„-i) 
Transformation of the dependent variable (x to x*): 
Xi* = (Vl-r2)»Xi 
x2* = x2 - (r • xi) 
x3* = x3 - (r • x2) 
I 
Xn* = x„ - (r • X„.i) 
D.        CORRELATION 
Correlation analysis measures the relationship between two items. You can use 
correlation analysis in two basic ways: to determine the predictive ability of an indicator 
and to determine the association between two items. When comparing the correlation 
between two items, one item is called the "dependent" variable and the other the 
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"independent" variable. The goal is to see if a change in the independent will result in a 
change in the dependent. This information helps you understand an indicator's predictive 
abilities. When comparing the correlation between a network incident and media 
visibility, a high positive coefficient (e.g., +0.70) tells you that a change in the visibility 
will usually predict a change in the level of incident. A high negative correlation (e.g., 
-0.70) tells you that when the visibility changes, the incident level will usually move in 
the opposite direction. The coefficient of correlation (r) is obtained from the coefficient 
of determination (r ). 
•=v r  \r 
The correlation coefficient can range between ±1.0 (plus or minus one). A coefficient of 
+1.0, a "perfect positive correlation," means that changes in the independent item will 
always result in a change in the dependent item. A coefficient of-1.0, a "perfect negative 
correlation," means that changes in the independent item will always result in a change in 
the dependent item, but the change will be in the opposite direction. A coefficient of zero 
means there is no relationship between the two items and that a change in the 
independent item will have no effect in the dependent item. A low correlation coefficient 
(e.g., less than ±0.10) suggests that the relationship between two items is weak or non- 
existent. A high correlation coefficient (i.e., closer to plus or minus one) indicates that the 
dependent variable will usually change when the independent variable changes. The 
direction of the dependent variable's change depends on the sign of the coefficient. If the 
coefficient is a positive number, then the dependent variable will move in the same 
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direction as the independent variable; if the coefficient is negative, then the dependent 
variable will move in the opposite direction of the independent variable. 
The coefficient of determination measures the proportion of variation in the 
dependent variable (network incidents) that is explained by the independent variable (US 
visibility). 
r2 = regression sum of squares (SSR) -r total sum of squares (SST) 
The coefficient of determination is a measurement, usually represented by a percentage 
value that indicates either a high or low linear relationship between the two variables 
based on the ability of the regression model to account for changes in the independent 
variable. A higher coefficient of determination (r2) would be statistically significant in 
indicating a strong linear relationship between the variables and would be statistically 
equivalent to the slope (bi) being significantly different from zero. 
r2 > 0    *    bi > 0 
To fully understand how the independent variable predicts the dependent variable it is 
necessary to determine the total sum of squares (SST). SST is a measure of variation on 
the independent variable values around their mean and is equal to the sum of the squared 
differences between each observed value (Y;) and the mean value of (Y). 
SST = Z (Yi - Y)2 
And the regression sum of squares (SSR). SSR is attributed to the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variable, and is equal to the sum of the squared 
differences between each predicted value of (Yj) and the mean of (Y). 
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SSR = I(Yi-Y)2 
E.        PROCESS 
The first step is to aggregate the Naval network data based on the desired time, in 
this case a weekly aggregate, then determine the summary statistics and produce a 
timeline graph.  Next,  convert the FBIS foreign media data into a Galaxy visualization 
format using the SPIRE visual information analysis software. Conduct a visual review of 
the galaxy display to identify any obvious or unusual patterns.   Third, utilize SPIRE's 
analysis  tools to  better understand the relationships  represented  in the  Galaxies 
visualization. Specifically, the analysis of data will be as follows; 1) Use the Query tool, 
with the key phrase "United States" to identify all documents that are related to or 
reference the United States.   2) Use the Group tool to create a sub-set of documents 
within the FBIS data.  3) Use the Time Sheer tool to separate the United States grouped 
documents for the entire year by week of occurrence.   Finally, combine the network 
incident data with the FBIS data to produce a timeline graph for 1999.  Conduct visual 
analysis of the plotted incident data and FBIS data to determine any obvious features or 
patterns.   Specifically, any group of FBIS visibility data that immediately precedes an 
increase or rise in the level of network incidents.   Alone, an individual document or 
group of FBIS visibility documents that precede a rise in network incidents are probably 
unrelated.   However, if this pattern repeats itself over time then that may indicate a 
potential connection or correlation.  Develop a null and alternate hypothesis to support 
the theory of correlation.    Conduct the Durbin-Watson statistic using the PH-Stat 
statistical  add-in package  for Microsoft  Excel  to   determine  if the  data  set  is 
autocorrelated. If autocorrelated, utilize the estimate of the autocorrelation parameter to 
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transform the independent and dependent variable to account for residual correlation. 
Reconduct  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic  to  confirm  that  autocorrelation  has  been 
eliminated. Finally, utilize Microsoft Excel to conduct regression analysis and determine 
the coefficient of correlation (r) between the two data sets. 
F.        SPIRE ANALYSIS TOOLS 
The analysis tools allow you to perform queries, group documents, view slices of 
your dataset based on document timestamps and on Boolean query logic, and retrieve 
statistically selected keywords called gisting terms for different regions of the dataset. 
By using these tools, you can explore relationships in your dataset that may not be 
immediately obvious in the Galaxies visualization. 
The Query Tool is designed to provide you with the ability to query a dataset 
using three different techniques; Vocabulary Word Queries: applying Boolean logic to 
vocabulary words, Exact Phrase Queries: searching with controlled scope and case 
sensitivity and Queries by Example: measuring proximity of words in high-dimensional 
space. Using this tool is a good way to begin to locate specific information in a dataset. 
By entering a query, you can quickly find concentrations of documents containing topical 
areas of interest, and identify related documents that are located nearby but may not 
contain the query terms or phrases. The Query tool also enables you to automatically 
select and group the documents located by a query. Grouping tool is a convenient way of 
organizing sets of documents in the Galaxies visualization. By assigning documents to a 
group, you can rapidly retrieve query results, use set operations to examine the union, 
difference, and intersection of document sets, and reselect sets of groups. With the Time 
Sheer you can explore how your dataset evolves over time. The Time Sheer works by 
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examining the timestamp in each document, and partitioning the dataset into discrete time 
slice views. Document counts for each time slice are depicted in a histogram. By 
interacting with this histogram, you can rapidly "slice" through a dataset and watch your 
information evolve over time. The Time Slicer can partition a dataset only if timestamps 
are available when the dataset is initially processed, with the granularity of the slices 
dependent on the granularity of the timestamps. The Time Slicer is designed to slice time 
intervals ranging from years down to individual minutes. 
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VI.    ANALYSIS 
Four charts were developed to indicate weekly FBIS document distribution for 
each quarter of 1999. The charts (Figures 6.1 through 6.4) display the total number of 
documents in a given week, as compared to the number of documents that indicate 
United States visibility within the same week. The first step in analysis of a time series is 
to plot the data to identify trends. A chart (see Figure 6.5) was constructed to display the 
level of network incidents and United States visibility within those documents during the 
year 1999. An initial visual inspection of the Incident and Visibility graph provides no 
clear or easily identifiable pattern. The only obvious similarity is that both sets of data 
have an increasing mean value, meaning that the number of events for both sets of data 
continues to grow in size throughout the year. As the data was collected quarterly and 
displayed in a chronological fashion for the year, the behavior of the data sets might be 
due to some seasonality influence. However, there is no information or data to support 
this theory. 
Based on the theory that there is a correlation between network incidents and US 
visibility in the foreign media, a hypothesis statement was formed. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no impact by the independent variable visibility (y) on the dependent variable 
incidents (x). The slope (bi), which is the change in (y) per unit change in (x), is zero. 
The alternate hypothesis will be the converse. 
H„: b, = 0 
Hi:bi*0 
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The level of significance (a) established for this hypothesis will be .01. This will reduce 
the probability of committing a Type I error (rejecting the null when it is true), while 
accepting a greater amount of risk of committing a Type II error (not rejecting the null 
when it is false). 
Prior to any regression analysis the Durbin-Watson test was run on the data set to 
determine the D value. This D value was then compared against critical values in a 
Durbin-Watson Critical Values table (Table E.8, Appendix E-17, ref: #3) to see if any 
autocorrelation between variable residuals was present. The Durbin-Watson table 
provides the upper and lower critical values based on the following parameters, the level 
of significance (a), the sample size (n), and the number of independent variables (p). 
a = .01, n = 52, p = 1 
dL = 1.32 
du = 1.40 
The Prentice-Hall Statistical (PH Stat) add-in program for Microsoft Excel analyzed the 
initial variables and produced a D value of .65. 
D = .65 < 1.32 
Because the D value is less than the lower critical value it can be concluded that positive 
autocorrelation exists among the residuals. To eliminate the autocorrelation it was 
necessary to transform the initial observations. This transformation was conducted by 
determining the estimate of the autocorrelation parameter (r) and utilizing this value to 
adjust both the independent and dependent variables. 
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1 - (D / 2) = r 
l-(.65/2) = r 
1 - .32 = r 
r = .68 
Once the observations had been transformed and autocorrelation accounted for, the 
Durbin-Watson test was run again on the adjusted data using the same initial parameters 
to validate the transformation. 
a = .01, n = 52, p = 1 
dL = 1.32 
du = 1.40 
This time the Durbin-Watson test produced a D value of 2.26. When the D value is 
greater than 2, indicating negative autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson upper and lower 
critical values must be adjusted by subtracting du and dL from 4. 
4-dL = dL* 4-du = du* 
4-1.32 = 2.68 4-1.40 = 2.60 
D = 2.26 < 2.60 
Because the D value is lower than four less the upper critical value from the table it can 
be concluded that the negative autocorrelation that is present is not statistically 
significant, and that regression analysis and its estimated parameters will not be biased. 
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Regression analysis of the transformed data provided a slope coefficient of-.06. 
bi = -.06 
The level of significance (a) of .01 established a confidence level of .99 or 99% for this 
hypothesis. Based on a 99% confidence level the upper and lower critical values were 
determined. 
lower 99% = -.24 upper 99% = .11 
-.24<-.06<.ll 
This established a region of nonrejection between -.24 and. 11. Since -.06 falls within the 
region of nonrejection the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Using Microsoft Excel's correlation analysis tool, the coefficient of correlation (r) 
was determined to be (. 12) approximately. 
r = Vr2 
r2 = 41812-=-2951276 = .014 
r = V.014 = .118 
.118 «.12 
As stated, correlation attempts to establish the strength of association between numerical 
values. In this case, a result of (.12) indicates an extremely low correlation. The 
proximity of the coefficient to the value zero indicates that there is almost a non-existent 
correlation between the level of network incidents and US visibility in the foreign media. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the confidence interval on bi. 
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VII.     CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        SUMMARY 
Intrusion detection is a process that is reactive in nature. The Navy currently 
faces the growing challenge of providing Information Assurance in a constantly changing 
technical environment. Under these conditions, NAVCDRT requires tools to quantify the 
impact of external factors on their communication network, identify potential negative 
impacts in a more timely and efficient manner and develop a process to neutralize them. 
This thesis examined Naval network incident data and Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service data from 1999, and attempted to do the following: 
1. Determine if a methodology could be developed to analyze incident and 
media data. 
2. Determine if a correlation exists between network incidents on Navy networks 
and visibility of the United States in the foreign media. 
A time series approach was utilized to analyze an aggregate of network incidents 
throughout the year, and compare them to United States visibility within the foreign 
media. The foreign media events were selected based on the amount of articles during the 
year 1999 that provided "visibility" by directly referencing the United States. Both sets 
of data were aggregated on a weekly basis. Analysis of the Naval network incident data 
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service media data for the year 1999 provided no 
indication that a correlation existed. The correlation coefficient between the two sets of 
data was approximately .12 suggesting that the relationship between the two is weak or 
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non-existent. In addition, the hypothesis that the slope coefficient was equal to zero was 
proven true showing that a change in the independent variable had no effect on the 
dependent variable. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The extremely low correlation coefficient between Naval network incidents and 
visibility within the foreign media supports the null hypothesis that a change in the 
independent variable visibility has no effect on the dependent variable incidents. Clearly, 
the level of Naval network incidents continued to increase throughout the year, but this 
can in no way be attributed to the amount of United States visibility within the foreign 
media at any particular time. Though the analysis represented in this thesis may 
represent a descriptive tool for what occurred during the period studied, it lacks the 
forecasting accuracy to provide legitimate opportunity for correlation analysis. However, 
it was possible to develop a process for analyzing network incidents and media visibility. 
And although this research was unable to provide any indication of correlation between 
the chosen data sets, the methodology itself offers potential for further refinement and 
application, and may prove to be a useful tool in providing for a more proactive process 
of network defense in the future. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Recommendations   for  improvements  to   correlation  research   fall   in  three 
categories: data collection, timeline analysis and methodology refinement.      Future 
studies should attempt to utilize incident data that has a specific originating source. • In 
the investigation of network incidents it is possible to determine not only the country of 
origin, but in many cases the responsible individual. Information of this nature is beyond 
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the scope of this research and in many cases is sensitive or classified in nature.   In 
addition, limiting the visibility data to media content that originates from the same 
country or geographical region as the incident data will provide for a more sound and 
logical attempt at correlation. Another technique at refinement would be to focus all data 
down to daily observations, which would allow for a more detailed and in-depth analysis. 
As more and more data becomes available the timeline may also be extended to include 
more than just one year in the sample size. A larger population would provide for a more 
complete and accurate statistical analysis.     In addition, while the SPIRE visual 
information analysis tool was vital in mining the FBIS data for the general numbers, the 
actual interface to extract the specific events was a completely manual process. It would 
not only speed the research process to automate the data mining, data extraction and data 
analysis process, but provide for the ability to analyze larger or even multiple sets of data. 
It may be possible to completely automate the process of FBIS data mining and 
correlation analysis through the development of specialized software. . 
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